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This paper examines the influence of Spanish major political events on the stock market 
performance. The analytical results demonstrate that there are no systematic differences 
in excess returns in the last two years preceding an election, that market responses are of 
the same magnitude when incumbents win or lose the election, and that there is no 
difference between the excess returns during left-leaning and right-leaning 
governments. Regarding to the stock market performance around election dates, 
negative price changes are observed in the days prior to elections, reverting to positive 
once the election takes place. Our results are in line with the work of Brown, Harlow and 
Tinic (1988) on the Uncertain Information Hypothesis that postulates that volatility of 
stock returns increases following the arrival of unexpected information and prices rise as 
uncertainty is resolved. 
Keywords: politics, excess returns, stock market performance.  
JEL classification: G14, D81, H11. 
 
Resumen 
Este trabajo examina la influencia de la política en el comportamiento del mercado 
bursátil español. Analíticamente se demuestra que no hay diferencias sistemáticas en los 
rendimientos anormales de las acciones durante los dos años anteriores a la celebración 
de elecciones, que la respuesta del mercado es la misma con independencia de que un 
determinado partido revalide su victoria electoral y que no existen diferencias entre los 
rendimientos anormales de las acciones observados bajo gobiernos de izquierdas o de 
derechas. Con respecto al comportamiento de las acciones durante el periodo anterior y 
posterior a la fecha de las elecciones, se observan disminuciones en los precios en los 
días previos a las elecciones convirtiéndose en incrementos con posterioridad a las 
mismas. Estos resultados son consistentes con la hipótesis de información incierta de 
Brown et al. (1988), de acuerdo con la cual, la volatilidad de los rendimientos de las 
acciones se incrementa con la aparición en el mercado de información que no se 
esperaba y los precios se recuperan a medida que desaparece la incertidumbre. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Since Niederhoffer et al. (1970) analyzed the stock market movements in the 
days and weeks surrounding US presidential elections, the study of the relationships 
between politics and the stock market has generated much research of interest. Thus, a 
great number of studies have analyzed several topics such as the influence of economic 
events on election voting; the relationship of the expected stock return with economic 
factors; the link between stock markets performance and political election dates, and the 
explanatory power of political risk in emerging and developed markets.
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Recently, some studies have shed new empirical evidence that has boosted the 
interest for this type of financial literature. This is the case of the event study by 
Pantzalis et al. (2000) that examine stock market behavior around elections on an 
international scale (33 countries), and find that index returns are generally positive and 
significant in the 2 weeks prior to the election week. They find that this abnormal return 
is strongest for elections with the highest degrees of uncertainty, in particular, in 
countries with low rankings of political, economic, and press freedom, and elections in 
which the incumbent looses. Bialkowski et al. (2008) investigate a sample of 27 OECD 
countries to test whether national elections induce higher stock market volatility. Their 
empirical findings indicate that investors are still surprised by the ultimate distribution 
of votes. Stock prices react strongly in response to this surprise and temporarily 
elevated levels of volatility are observed.  
 
Regarding the relationship between the political orientation of government and 
stock market returns, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and Booth and Booth (2003) 
show that US stock market returns are higher during Democratic than during 
Republican presidencies. Booth and Booth (2003) also find excess returns under 
Democratic presidents for a small-cap stock portfolio, while large-cap stock excess 
returns are not significantly different from each other during the 1926–1996 period. 
Moreover, US stock excess returns are significantly higher in the last two years than in 
the first two years of the presidential term. Vuchelen (2003) focuses on the Belgian 
market and concludes that when a centre-left coalition takes office after an election, 
stock prices slightly increase, whereas a centre-right coalition would push stock prices 
down. Recently, Bialkowski et al. (2007) has fuelled controversy in this topic. In a 
                                                 
1 See Chen et al. (2005), Bohl and Gottschalk (2006), Döpke and Pierdzinoch (2006), and He et al. 
(2008), among others, for a comprehensive review of different studies that have analyzed the empirical 
relationships between stock markets and politics.   
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comprehensive analysis that takes into account 24 stock markets and 173 different 
governments, they do not observe statistically significant differences in returns between 
left-wing and right-wing executives.  
 
Finally, both Foerster and Schmitz (1997) and Wong and McAleer (2009) show 
that US stock prices fell during the first half of a Presidency, reached a trough in the 
second year, rose during the second half of a Presidency, and reached a peak in the third 
or fourth year.  
 
The rationale behind these studies is the theory of the Political Business Cycle 
(PBC) that was pioneered by Nordhaus (1975) who pointed out that “within an 
incumbent’s term in office there is a predictable pattern of policy, starting with relative 
austerity in early years and ending with the potlatch right before elections” (see 
Nordhaus, 1975, p. 187). In the PBC literature, we find two schools that try to explain 
how the political process induces cycles in stock market performance. On one hand, the 
“opportunistic” PBC theory argues that the incumbent governments use expansionary 
policy measures to improve the economic situation just before an upcoming election. 
The existence of these government cycles, also known as presidential cycles in the case 
of the USA, would imply that significant and positive returns should be observed in the 
months preceding an election. On the other hand, the “partisan” PBC theory argues that 
a “partisan” cycle is detectable in stock market returns because left-wing governments, 
unlike right-wing governments, focus more on expansionary policies, while the right-
wing governments are more worried about the control of the inflation. It implies that 
differences in the ideological composition of the governments will be reflected in 
economic policies and, as a consequence, in the stock price behavior. 
 
It is worth noting that the “opportunistic” PBC implies that policy-makers 
systematically aim for a rise in stock prices preceding elections. Following Vuchelen 
(2003), this fact leads to comparable empirical implications as the Uncertain 
Information Hypothesis (UIH) proposed by Brown et al. (1988, 1993). The UIH 
assumes that investors set prices before an event takes place. In responding to the 
increased uncertainty, investors set stock prices below their fundamental values. An 
upward corrective trend in security prices will then follow as the election result 
becomes more certain. As election-induced uncertainty is reduced, the risk-adjusted 
expected return should fall and stock prices should rise. However, Mehdian et al. (2008) 
suggest that the greatest degree of uncertainty resolution and thus the highest observed   6
returns should be expected in the time period immediately preceding the election date as 
this is when media coverage and campaigning are at their peak.  
 
The aim of this paper is to study the link between politics and the Spanish stock 
exchange by testing both the empirical implications of the two schools of the Political 
Business Theory and the Uncertain Information Hypothesis. As far as we know, this is 
the first study that analyzes all these topics for the Spanish stock exchange at a country 
level. Furthermore, the case of Spain presents some interesting peculiarities that deserve 
special attention. Firstly, attending to the 1985 Electoral Law in Spain (art 69.7), no pre-
election polls may be published or divulged by any communications media in the five 
days preceding the date of polling. Secondly, Spain has a proportional electoral system 
and, in such countries, the main political event is not the elections result but the final 
composition of the multi-party coalition. Finally, besides the Spanish national left or 
right-wing parties, the Spanish map is comprised of independent parties in some regions 
that have shown to be of great importance for the stability of the national government.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
financial and electoral data used in the study. Section 3 is concerned with testing the 
empirical implications of the Political Business Cycle theory. In section 4, the analysis 
of the stock market performance, not only in terms of the mean returns but also of the 
volatility, around election-related events is carried out. Finally, section 5 summarizes 
with some concluding remarks.  
2.   Data  
The financial data have been obtained from MSCI Barra and cover the period 
from January 1976 to October 2008. We utilize daily stock return data for MSCI Spain 
Index and MSCI World Index. These indices are free float-adjusted market 
capitalization weighted indices and both of them are expressed in US dollar terms. The 
MSCI Spain Index comprises of Spanish equities listed in Spain, while the MSCI World 
Index is designed to measure the equity market performance of the most developed 
markets. Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of returns on MSCI Spain 
Index and MSCI World Index. The sample period consists of 7726 observations. 
                                                 
2 Pantzalis et al. (2000) and Bialkowski et al. (2008) include six and seven general elections in Spain in 
their respective event studies. However, both analysis are carried out at an international level and mixing 
countries with different types of elections (presidential and parliamentary). Following Vuchelen (2003, p. 
87), this fact could be relevant given that in two-party political systems, elections remove all uncertainty 
concerning future policies.    7
Skewness and kurtosis measures and Bera-Jarque test show substantial departures from 
normality in both indices. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A displays some descriptive statistics of the MSCI Spain index and the MSCI World index 
returns series. Panel B shows the results of the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and the Elliot, 
Rothenberg and Stock Point Optimal (ERS) unit root tests. The critical values of the ADF (ERS) 
test for the rejection of the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root are -3.96, -3.41 and -
3.12 (3.96, 5.62 and 6.89) for the series in levels and -3.4336, -2.8621 and -2.5671 (1.99, 3.26 
and 4.48) for the series in differences for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
  MSCI Spain Index returns  MSCI World Index returns 
Mean (%)  0.017  0.031 
Median (%)  0.003  0.054 
Standard Deviation (%)  1.360  0.813 
Minimum -0.224  -0.104 
Maximum 0.092  0.081 
Skewness -0.785  -0.514 







    
Panel B. Unit Root Tests 
  MSCI Spain Index  MSCI World Index 
  In levels  In returns  In levels  In returns 
ADF Statistic  -2.39  -78.92  -1.98  -59.35 
ERS Statistic  35.01  0.01  13.47  0.13 
 
 
Political election details have been obtained from the website of the Spanish 
Ministry of Interior (www.mir.es). Democracy in Spain was reinstalled following the 
death of Dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, who governed since the end of the Spanish 
Civil War in 1939. The first election in the democratic transition took place in June 
1977 and the winner was the party Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) whose leader 
was Adolfo Suárez. The Spanish Constitution, approved in 1978, established Spain as a 
                                                 
3 See further details about the methodology about index definitions at www.mscibarra.com  (last accessed 
4/6/2009).   8
parliamentary monarchy, with the President of the Government and a Spanish Congress 
of 350 members elected every 4 years. The evolution of the number of seats got by 
party in the Spanish General Elections from the democratic transition until 2008 is 
represented in Figure 1. After a short period of unstable UCD governments the Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) led by Felipe González got the absolute majority in 
October 1982 and the PSOE ruled for the next 13 years. In March 1996, the Partido 
Popular (PP) of José María Aznar obtained a relative majority that implied a change 
from a left-wing government to a right-wing government. Since then, the PP governed 
during eight years, until the 2004 elections in which the PSOE and its leader, José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero, won the elections and repeated victory in 2008 elections.  
 
Figure 1. Seat evolution in Spain 
 
Evolution of the number of seats got by party in the Spanish General Elections from the 
democratic transition until 2008. The figure represents the evolution of the number of seats got 
by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and the Partido Popular (PP), and the sum of 
seats got by all independent parties from Catalonia and Basque Country. The Spanish 
Congress has 350 members; therefore the absolute majority is reached with 176 seats. Source: 










1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008
PSOE PP Independent Parties
 
 
It is important to remark that the Spanish Constitution of 1978 allowed for the 
creation of regional governments. In March 1980, the first regional elections were held   9
in the Basque Country and Catalonia, and since then in the rest of the 17 regions that 
constitute Spain. It is worth noticing that independent parties in both regions have had a 
significant presence in the regional and national governments and they have been of 
great importance for the stability of the national government when the winner parties 
did not get the absolute majority (less than 176 seats). For these reasons, we have also 
considered in our study the effects of the regional elections that have taken place in the 
above mentioned regions since 1980. On the whole, the election information that we 
have selected includes the election date and the election outcome of 10 national 
elections, 16 regional elections, 5 European elections, 4 general referendums, and the 
corresponding dates of investiture of national and regional elections. 
3.   Political business cycle in Spanish stock market 
Two theories try to explain how politics affects stock market performance. On 
the one hand, the theory of “opportunistic” PBC is based on the assumption that voters 
take into account their financial situation when voting. According to that theory, the 
incumbent government would have an incentive to implement short-term policies 
oriented to promote rising stock prices as election date approaches. In this sense, it 
should be noted that the larger the number of voters that invest on the stock market, the 
greater the incentive for the incumbent government to use policy instruments that 
increase the stream of expected dividends.  
 
On the other hand, the “partisan” PBC theory maintains that the ideology of a 
government also matters, since differences in ideology will lead to policy differences 
and will consequently have a different impact on stock prices. Further, effects may be 
temporary and disappear once election results are known (rational party models), or 
permanent over the term of the government (traditional party models).   
 
3.1. The “opportunistic” PBC theory at the Spanish stock exchange 
 
To test empirically whether these hypothesis hold for the Spanish case, we use a 
model based on the International Market Model (IMM) within a GARCH(1,1) 
framework to test the empirical implications of the model because it is especially 
suitable for analyzing daily data with leptokurtosis and volatility clustering. The IMM 
model allows us to remove the global influences from the local return series, since it 
proposes a single-factor return-generating process in which returns of the country are 
sensitive to movements in a World market index. The return on the MSCI World index   10
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where RSt is the return on Spanish index at time t, RWt is the return on the World index 
at time t, εt is the residual Spanish return at time t, and ht is the conditional volatility of 
εt.  0 γ  denotes the long term mean or unconditional variance,  1 γ reflects the dependence 
of the current volatility upon news about volatility from the previous period and  2 γ  
reflects the dependence of the current volatility on the conditional variance of the 
previous period. Finally,  2 1 γ γ +  indicates the degree of volatility persistence. 
 
Note that both RSt and RWt represent the time series of returns computed directly 
from the logged differences in the levels of MSCI Spain Index and MSCI World Index, 
respectively. Before undertaking the estimation, both series were tested for stationary 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity (ADF) and the Elliot, Rothenberg, and 
Stock Point Optimal (ERS) tests. The use of returns, as in Model (1), is helpful to 
transform the underlying series into stationary. Indeed, as shown in Panel B of Table 1, 
the ADF statistic value is -2.39 (-1.98), which is greater than the critical values at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, so that the unit-root hypothesis cannot be rejected for the 
MSCI Spain Index (MSCI World Index) series in levels. However, both the MSCI 
Spain Index and the MSCI World Index series in compound returns are stationary 
processes, with an ADF statistic value of -78.92 and -59.35, respectively. Similarly, the 
ERS statistic values for the MSCI Spain and World indices series in levels respectively 
are 35.01 and 13.47, meaning that the null of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 1% 
level (critical value 3.96). The ERS statistic values are 0.01 and 0.13 respectively for the 
MSCI Spain index and the MSCI World index in compound returns. In both cases, they 
are lower than 1.99 (critical value at the 1% level), which lead us to conclude that these 
series are stationary.   
 
It should be noticed that the returns on the Spanish and the World Index are 
measured contemporaneously, assuming that the explanatory variable is available on a 
timely basis and have an immediately influence over the return series. This assumption 
follows prior literature and is consistently with the timely incorporation of price 
information in financial markets (see Pantzalis et al. (2000) and Bialkowski et al.   11
(2008)). To be precise, fifty percent of stocks that makes up of the MSCI World index 
are available at the same time than those of the MSCI Spanish index, while the 
remaining (mostly non-European) fifty per cent keeps on being traded after the Spanish 
Market closing (17:35 Madrid time). We would like to note that we have regressed the 
MSCI Spanish index return on the one-lagged MSCI World index return and the 
estimation result does not improve in accordance with the adjusted R-squared, the 
minimized Akaike information criterion (AIC), and Schwartz criterion (SC)
4. This 
result is not surprising at all, merely reflecting the fact that Spanish stocks are more 
correlated to European stocks than to those from American markets.  
 
Additionally, given that the majority of the elections have been held on 
weekends,
5 we have taken into account the results found in Peiró (1994) for the Monday 
effect in the Spanish Market. Specifically, Peiró (1994) found that Spanish stock returns 
exhibited daily seasonality that was specially marked in positive Monday returns due to 
the clearing procedure employed until 25 November 1991. Indeed, the so-called 
Monday effect stopped playing a role in determining Spanish returns once the clearing 
procedures changed. A dummy variable called Mt designed to capture such an effect is 
included in the model, taking the value 1 whenever t is any Monday before the 
mentioned date, and 0 otherwise.  
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                    (2) 
 
Estimation results of Model (2) are presented in Table 2. The coefficient on the 
market portfolio is significant and positive, revealing the strong relationship between 
the Spanish index returns and the World index returns. The coefficient on the Monday 
effect is also significant and positive, which is consistent with Peiró (1994) findings. 
However, the model still shows large serial correlation via Durbin-Watson and LJung-
Box Q-statistics (see panel B of Table 2). The AR(1) component of the mean equation 
of the return is aimed at controlling for serial correlation.  
 
2




⋅ + ⋅ + =
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =
t t t
t t t t t
h h
M RS RW RS
ε γ γ γ
ε δ χ β α
   (3) 
                                                 
4 The adjusted R-squared drastically drops from 24.42% to 0.10% and the AIC and SC respectively pass 
from -6.21 to -5.91 and from -6.20 to -5.90. 
5 It is the case of all national elections from 1986 onward and of every regional election with the only two 
exceptions of 1980 and 2006 Catalan regional elections.   12
A potential problem in the estimation of Model (3) is the possible correlation 
among the explanatory variables. However, the correlation matrix of the explanatory 
variables indicates that there is no reason of concern
6. From panel B of Table 2, it can 
be observed that serial correlation has been removed from the disturbances, according to 
Durbin-Watson and Ljung-Box Q-statistics.  
 
Table 2. Estimates of Models 2 and 3 
 
Panel A presents the estimates of Model (2) and Model (3). RSt is the return on Spanish index 
at time t, RWt is the return on the World index at time t, Mt is a dummy variable capturing the 
Monday effect on Spanish returns before 25 November 1991. Panel B reports the Adjusted R
2, 
the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) the Schwarz Criteria (SC), the Durbin-Watson statistic (D-
W), and the Ljung-Box Q-statistic for standardized (Ljung-Box Q1) and standardized squared 
residuals (Ljung-Box Q2) with the p-values in parenthesis. * denotes statistical significance at 
the 1% level. 
 
Panel A  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic 
α -3.95E-05  -0.3549 -3.84E-05  -0.3512 
RWt 0.8774* 81.772  0.8702*  80.877 
RSt-1  - -  0.0494*  5.4183 
Mt 0.0028*  6.4413  0.0028*  6.5081 
0 γ  1.17E-06*  9.7964  1.22E-09*  9.3293 
1 − t h   0.0657* 22.948  0.0674*  21.0055 
2
2 − t ε  0.9306*  368.616  0.9291*  323.678 
 
Panel B  Model 2  Model 3 
Adjusted R
2  24.81% 25.46% 
AIC -6.21  -6.21 
SC -6.20  -6.20 
D-W 1.87  1.97 
  Ljung-Box Q 1  Ljung-Box Q 2  Ljung-Box Q 1  Ljung-Box Q 2 
Lag(1)  26.653 (0.000)  0.3692* (0.543) 2.224 (0.136)  0.313 (0.576) 
Lag(2)  27.181 (0.000)  0.3692* (0.831) 2.495 (0.287)  0.322 (0.851) 
Lag(3)  28.272 (0.000)  0.6093* (0.894) 3.515 (0.319)  0.593 (0.898) 
Lag(4)  28.437 (0.000)  0.6259* (0.960) 3.605 (0.462)  0.625 (0.960) 
Lag(5)  28.643 (0.000)  0.8822* (0.971) 3.814 (0.577)  0.881 (0.972) 
Lag(36)  54.972 (0.022)  9.3156* (1.000) 3.814 (0.702)  8.357 (1.000) 
                                                 
6 Specifically, the correlations for each pair of explanatory variables are World return/one-lagged Spanish 
return (0.05), World return/Monday (-0.02) and one-lagged Spanish return/Monday (0.004).    13
Booth and Booth (2003) report that the US stock market tends to perform better in the 
second half of the presidential term, which is consistent with the “opportunistic” PBC 
theory. Following that theory, short-term policies may be used by the incumbent 
government with the main aim to increase stock prices and therein to win votes. 
 
Table 3. Estimates of Models 4 and 5 
 
Panel A presents the estimates of Model (4) and Model (5). Pc1t and Pc2t are dummy variables 
related to political cycle. RSt is the return on Spanish index at time t, RWt is the return on the 
World index at time t, Mt is a dummy variable capturing the Monday effect on Spanish returns 
before 25 November 1991, Pc1t  is a dummy variable  taking the value one if t belongs to the 
second half of each government’s term, and 0 otherwise,  Pc2t is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the incumbent is re-elected and t is in the first half of his new government’s term. Panel B 
reports the Adjusted R
2, the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Schwarz Criteria (SC), 
and the Durbin-Watson statistic (D-W). * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 1% (10%) 
level. 
 
Panel A  Model 4  Model 5 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic 
Α  0.0001 0.6464  -0.0002  -1.3277 
RWt  0.8770* 80.7967  0.8692*  81.0792 
RSt-1  0.0495* 5.4178  0.0493*  5.4073 
Mt 0.0029*  6.6844 0.0028*  6.4149 
Pc1t -0.0003  -1.2063     
Pc2t     0.0004**  1.6575 
0 γ   1.23E-06* 9.2707  1.25E-06*  9.3003 
1 − t h   0.0678* 21.0570  0.0682*  20.9272 
2
2 − t ε   0.9287* 320.5593  0.9282*  318.8165 
 
Panel B  Model 4  Model 5 
Adjusted R
2  25.43% 25.43% 
AIC -6.21  -6.21 
SC -6.20  -6.20 
D-W 1.97  1.97 
 
To check this hypothesis for the Spanish case, the mean equation in Model 3 is then 
augmented with the political-cycle variable which is the variable of interest  
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where Pc1t is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if t belongs to the second half of 
each government’s term and 0 otherwise.
7  
 
Estimation results of Model (4) allow us to conclude that Spanish excess 
returns have not been statistically significant higher during the second half of 
government’s term, meaning that there is no evidence supporting the theory of 
“opportunistic” PBC for the Spanish case. Indeed, the coefficient on the political cycle 
variable, Pc1, is not significantly different from zero (see Table 3). In this sense, it is 
useful to remark that, according to Block and Vaaler (2004), contrarily to developing 
countries in which empirical works coincide in asserting that there is a link between 
elections and the implementation of policies consistent with incumbent aims of 
retaining office, the evidence of political business cycles in industrialized countries is 
mixed.  
 
As an alternative way to test for the same hypothesis, the Pc1t variable is 
replaced by Pc2t, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the incumbent is re-elected 
and t is in the first half of his new government’s term, and zero otherwise. Then, the 
resulting Model (5) is estimated. In this case, one should expect that the coefficient on 
Pc2t will be significantly negative under hypothesis of political business cycle.  
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As shown in Table 3, the estimation results lead to the same conclusion, given 
that φ2 is statistically positive at the 10% level. It implies that Spanish excess returns are 
significantly positive during the first half of the new government’s term after the 
incumbent’s re-election, and this result is just the opposite to what expected following 
the “opportunistic” PBC theory that presumed a correction in returns after elections.  
 
3.2. The “partisan” PBC theory at the Spanish stock exchange  
 
We then investigate whether the ideological composition of the government 
may affect the performance of the Spanish stock market, as the “partisan” PBC theory 
                                                 
 
7 We obtain similar results if we define the political-cycle dummy variable to take on increasing numeric 
values during the first half of a government’s term and decreasing numeric values during the second half 
of a government’s term.      15
postulates. Following Vuchelen (2003), we distinguish between temporary and 
permanent effects on economic variables. The former effects are tested by adding three 
dummy variables to the mean equation of Model (3) that take the value 1 when a 
particular ideological party wins: 
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            (6) 
 
i_wt equals 1 if t is the election day, or the first trading day after elections if election day 
takes place during the weekend, and the ‘i’ party has won elections, where i= UCD 
(centre), PSOE (left-wing), PP (right-wing), 
 
Estimation results from Model (6) are reported in Table 4. Note that the 
coefficients of the variables that respectively capture the effects of a victory of the UCD 
( 1 φ ) and the PP ( 3 φ ) parties are significantly negative, whereas the coefficient of the 
variable related to the victory of the PSOE party ( 2 φ ) is not significantly different from 
zero. This result indicates that Spanish returns react negatively to the victory of the 
UCD party and, to a lesser extent, PP party, while there is no impact when PSOE wins 
elections. 
 
To test the presence of permanent effects, these dummy variables are replacing 
by UCDt, PSOEt and PPt that equal 1 over the term of the centre, left-wing and right-
wing governments:  
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However, the above model cannot be directly estimated, since the 
correlation values of each pair of the three political dummies are high enough to infer 
that multicollinearity may be present. Hence, these variables are not bundled together 
into one equation in order to avoid multicollinearity problems. In contrast, we 
estimate separately three equations: 
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               (7) 
 
where i= UCD (centre) or PSOE (left-wing) or PP (right-wing).  
 
As shown in Table 4, the variable testing for the permanent effects in all three 
cases is not statistically significant. As an overall conclusion of this section, it can be  
 
Table 4. Estimates of Models 6 and 7 
 
Panel A presents the estimates of Model (6) and Model (7). UCD_wt, PSOE_wt, and PP_wt, 
(UCDt, PSOEt and PPt) are dummy variables to test for temporary (permanents) effects of the 
ideological composition of the government on economic variables. RSt is the return on Spanish 
index at time t, RWt is the return on the World index at time t, Mt is a dummy variable capturing 
the Monday effect on Spanish returns before 25 November 1991. Panel B reports the Adjusted 
R
2, the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), the Schwarz Criteria (SC), and the Durbin-Watson 
statistic (D-W). * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 1% (10%) level. 
 
 
Panel A  Model 6  Model 7.1  Model 7.2  Model 7.3 
Variable  Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. 
Α -4.39E05  -0.396  -2.13E-05  -0.191 0.0002  1.071 -0.0001 -0.922 
RWt 0.8680*  80.773  0.8700*  80.441  0.8670* 80.489 0.8701* 80.974 
RSt-1  0.0543* 5.934 0.0492*  5.403  0.0496* 5.430 0.0494* 5.418 
Mt 0.0028*  6.636  0.0023*  6.451  0.0029* 6.626 0.0029* 6.571 
UCD_wt -0.0603*  -61.718             
PSOE_wt  -0.0016 -0.401             
PP_wt  -0.0319* -22.703             
UCDt     -0.0006  -1.412      
PSOEt        -0.0003  -1.392     
PPt            0.0003  1.346 
0 γ  1.41E-06*  9.6577  1.22E-06*  9.251 1.24E-06* 8.980 1.24E-06*  9.350 
1 − t h   0.0751* 21.4740 0.0670* 20.847 0.0675* 21.001 0.0673  20.882 
2




Model 6  Model 7.1  Model 7.2  Model 7.3 
Adjusted R
2  24.74% 25.49%  25.44% 25.48% 
AIC -6.22  -6.20  -6.21  -6.21 
SC -6.21  -6.21  -6.20  -60.20 
D-W 1.97  1.97  1.97  1.97 
   17
stated that with respect to elections, considered as political events, the experience of the  
Spanish Stock Exchange weakly  supports the rational “partisan” theory, given that 
excess returns are temporarily affected only by the victory of the centre and right-left 
parties. 
4.  Elections and stock market performance 
As previously reported, Brown et al. (1988, 1993) developed the so-called 
“Uncertain Information Hypothesis” (UIH) noting that when election-induced 
uncertainty is reduced, the risk-adjusted expected return falls and stock prices rise. 
Therefore, positive price changes should be expected following the election as 
uncertainty about the election outcome is resolved. 
 
In this section, we investigate the impact of political events on the information 
assimilation process of Spanish stock markets. Politics in Spain presents some 
interesting and distinctive features. Firstly, the Spanish election law forbids that pre-
election polls may be released by any communications media in the five days preceding 
the date of polling. Thus, according to the Uncertain Information Hypothesis (UIH) 
proposed by Brown et al. (1988, 1993), we would expect a peak of uncertainty 
resolution only when official election outcomes are made public. Secondly, given that 
Spain has a proportional electoral system, we have also analysed the Spanish stock 
market performance when the uncertainty about the composition of the government is 
eliminated, namely in the date of investiture session. Finally, due to the importance of 
Catalan and Basque independent parties for the stability of the national government, we 
also consider the date of regional elections and regional investiture. 
 
4.1. Response of returns to political events 
 
An important topic is whether stock prices are politically sensitive and returns 
react positively (or negatively) to elections and other elections-related political events. 
To answer this question, we perform the analysis following a stepwise scheme, starting 
with the model presented in Model (3) and progressively expanding it with the inclusion 
of new regressors in order to assess separately the effect of the different political events 
on stock returns. To discriminate between different model specifications, we use the 
likelihood ratio test as a test of the validity of one model relative to the other, which is 
summarized as follows. 
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Suppose that M1 is a model with parameter vector θ, and M0 is the subset of 
model M1 obtained by constraining k of the components of θ to be zero. Let l0(M0) and 
l1(M1) be the maximized value of the log-likelihood for models M0 and M1 respectively. 
M0 can be rejected in favour of M1 at the α level of significance if D=2[l1(M1) – l2(M2)] 
> cα, where cα is the (1-α) quantile of the 
2
k x distribution and k is the difference in the 
dimensionality of M1 and M0. D is known as the deviance statistic. 
 
Firstly, to examine whether returns are sensitive to election news, three dummy 









⋅ + ⋅ + =
+ +
+ + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =
t t t
t t
t t t t t t
h h
AN
N BN M RS RW RS
ε γ γ γ
ε π
π π δ χ β α
             (8) 
   
where BNt  takes the value 1 if t is one of the ten previous days to national election day, 
and 0 otherwise; Nt takes the value 1 if t is the election day or the day after the election 
day if election day takes place during the weekend or on a bank holiday, and 0 
otherwise; and ANt takes the value 1 if t is one of the five next days, and 0 otherwise. 
The choice of the number of days respectively included in the previous and the next 
period to national election day has been made in accordance with the minimized AIC 
and SC. 
 
  Estimation results are reported in Table 5. The deviance statistic highly exceeds 
the critical value at the 1% significance level, implying that the inclusion of these three 
political dummy variables improves the overall goodness-of-fit of the model. 
Consistently with the UIH, our findings show that excess returns are statistically 
negative prior to elections while they are significantly positive once elections’ outcome 
is known. Interestingly, excess returns remain statistically negative the first day after 
elections, as indicated by the value of π2. This result can be explained by the fact that 
the market needs time to obtain complete information about the forthcoming policies 
and information is transmitted gradually to market. As Pantzalis et al. (2000) point out, 
if the outcome of the election does not allow investors to immediately assess the effect 
on country’s future, positive changes should be expected following the election as 
uncertainty about those policies is resolved.  
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Table 5. Estimates of Models 8, 9 and 10 
 
Panel A presents the estimates of Model (8), (9) and (10).  BNt, Nt, and ANt, are dummy 
variables to test for any effect of the national elections on returns during the ten previous days 
(BNt), the election day or the first trading day after elections if elections take place on weekend 
(Nt) and the five days after elections (ANt), respectively. BIt, It and AIt are dummy variables to 
test for any effect of the day prior to national investiture session, the national investiture session 
day and the day after the national investiture session, respectively. Similarly, BRt, Rt and ARt 
are dummy variables capturing the effect, if any, on the day prior to regional elections, the 
regional elections day and the day after, respectively. RSt is the return on Spanish index at time 
t, RWt is the return on the World index at time t, Mt is a dummy variable capturing the Monday 
effect on Spanish returns before 25 November 1991. Panel B reports the Adjusted R
2, the 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), the Schwarz Criteria (SC), and the Durbin-Watson statistic (D-
W). Panel C shows the Benchmark Model and the corresponding deviance Statistic (critical 
values in parenthesis). * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Panel A  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
Variable  Coefficient t-stat.  Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient  t-stat. 
α  -2.94E-05 -0.265  -2.88E-05 -0.258 -3.36E-05  -0.301 
RWt  0.8665* 80.601  0.8666*  80.136 0.8661*  80.461 
RSt-1  0.0513* 5.684  0.0515* 5.651 0.0516*  5.705 
Mt 0.0029*  6.770  0.0029* 6.797 0.0029*  6.821 
BNt  -0.0040* -5.654  -0.0040* -5.654 -0.0040*  -5.664 
Nt  -0.0212* -20.046  -0.0212*  -19.960 -0.0212*  -19.978 
ANt  0.0079* 8.400  0.0078* 8.400 0.0078*  8.380 
BIt     -0.0038  -0.970     
It     0.0025  0.599     
AIt     -0.0012  -0.322     
BRt         0.0014  0.7370 
Rt         -0.0022  -0.6478 
ARt         0.0024  0.8820 
0 γ   1.31E-06* 8.204  1.31E-06* 7.886 1.31E-06*  8.201 
1 − t h   0.0745* 20.657  0.0745*  20.646 0.0747*  20.641 
2
2 − t ε   0.9214* 300.54  0.9214*  296.55 0.9213*  299.77 
Panel B  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
Adjusted R
2  24.79% 24.79%  24.78% 
AIC -6.22  -6.22  -6.22 
SC -6.21  -6.21  -6.21 
D-W 1.96  1.96  1.97 
Panel C  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
Benchmark 
Model 
Model 3  Model 8  Model 8 
Deviance 
Statistic 
88.40* (13.4)  1.72 (13.4) 2.44  (13.4)   20
In countries with proportional representation, as it is the Spanish case, 
sometimes governments are multi-party coalitions whose composition is difficult to 
predict from the election results. In these cases, as stated by Vuchelen (2003), the main 
political event may be the composition of the coalition instead of election results 
themselves, although election outcome will however still have some effects on the stock 
market since the uncertainty is reduced.  
 
Hence, the analysis is extended to explore the responses, if any, of the market to 
the final composition of the government. It is in the Parliamentary investiture session 
that the candidate in the most voted party at the national elections presents his program 
with the aim to obtain the support from a majority in Congress. Thus, we introduce a 
dummy variable to capture the impact of the composition of the government derived 
from the investiture session. Also included are two dummy variables to pick up the 
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where BIt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is the day prior to investiture 
session and 0 otherwise; It is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is the investiture 
session day and 0 otherwise; and AIt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is the 
day after the investiture session and 0 otherwise.  
 
As reported in Table 5, none of the coefficients on the new variables of interest 
are statistically significant, indicating that there is no impact of the outcome of 
investiture sessions on Spanish returns. Obviously, the goodness-of-fit of the model 
does not improve with the inclusion of the dummy variables related to investiture 
session, according to the log likelihood test (See panel C in Table 5). 
 
In this sense, it is important to remark the fact that along the history of Spanish 
elections from the beginning of the transition to Democracy in 1975, only in two of the 
ten national elections there has been no clear winner, in the sense that the most voted 
party’s candidate was obliged to form a coalition to become president
8. Thus, in eighty 
                                                 
8 These two elections were the 1993 elections, won by PSOE, and the 1996 elections, won by PP (see 
Figure I).    21
percent of the cases, uncertainty around elections outcome has disappeared some days 
after election’s day and it has been no need to pact with the opposition so as to gain 
sufficient support for holding the office. In spite of that, except for the cases of absolute 
majority,
9 all candidates to Presidency have made efforts to make pacts with the other 
parties to assure further support during their government term. Furthermore, although 
not shown, we have re-estimated the Model (9) by replacing the dummy variables 
related to the investiture session by similar dummy variables that only consider the 
elections won without majority and focusing not only in the investiture session day but 
also on the day of the announcement of pacts or agreements between the candidate and 
the rest of the parties to obtain the required support. Results do not vary. Therefore, our 
findings show that Spanish excess returns are sensitive to national elections outcome 
only during the period surrounding elections, while are not sensitive to investiture 
sessions as political events. 
 
We next focus our attention on the regional elections and on their effects on 
stock exchange. In particular, as indicated previously, we only consider Catalan and 
Basque elections, mainly due to the fact that they have traditionally played an important 
role in the multi-party coalition governments’ formation and that these elections do not 
coincide in time with national elections. A total of sixteen (Catalan and Basque) 
regional elections have taking place in Spain from the very first one, Basque elections in 
1980, to the last (included) Catalan elections in 2006. To assess whether these regional 
elections have had any effect on the Spanish excess returns, three dummy variables are 
added to Model (8) as follows: 
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where BRt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is the day prior to regional 
elections and 0 otherwise; Rt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is regional 
elections day or the day after the election day if regional elections day takes place 
during the weekend or on a bank holiday, and 0 otherwise; and ARt is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if t is the day after regional elections and 0 otherwise.  
 
The conclusion drawn from estimation results reported in Table 5 is similar to 
that of investiture session’s impacts on the Spanish stock exchange. We obtain no 
                                                 
9 Absolute majority has been got once by PSOE (1982 elections) and once by PP (2000 elections).   22
evidence on the excess returns, derived from the Catalan and Basque regional elections 
taking place, since the coefficients on the dummy variables picking up such an impact 
are not significantly different from zero. Although not presented here, the same results 
are achieved when including separate dummy variables for the Basque and the Catalan 
regional elections, to check if there is any difference between them. Furthermore, note 
that the deviance statistic is not statistically significant, so that Model (10) does not fit 
better than Model (8) according to the likelihood test ratio.  
 
We also check whether there is any impact of regional investiture sessions on 
excess returns by substituting the dummy variables related to regional elections day 
with other similar dummy variables referred to regional investiture session day. The 
resultant model, Model (11), is: 
 
2
1 2 1 1 0




⋅ + ⋅ + =
+ + + +
+ + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =
t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t t
h h
ARI RI BRI AN
N BN M RS RW RS
ε γ γ γ
ε ρ ρ ρ π
π π δ χ β α
                      (11) 
 
where BRIt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is the day prior to regional 
investiture session, and 0 otherwise; RIt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is the 
regional investiture session day, and 0 otherwise; and ARIt is a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 if t is the day after the regional investiture session, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The results lead us to conclude that there is no influence of regional elections on 
Spanish excess returns, neither surrounding the regional elections day, as previously 
reported, nor surrounding the regional investiture session day (see Table 6). 
 
  To make a complete analysis of the influence of elections as political events on 
the Spanish stock exchange, European elections are additionally considered. Our sample 
includes five European elections taking place in 1987, 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004. 
Once more, three dummy variables capturing the effects of these elections on the 
Spanish excess returns in the previous day, the day in which elections took place and 
the day after elections are added to Model (8): 
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where BEt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is the day prior to European    23
 
Table 6. Estimates of Models 11, 12 and 13 
 
Panel A presents the estimates of Model (11), (12) and (13). BNt, Nt, and ANt, are dummy 
variables to test for any effect of the national elections on returns during the ten previous days 
(BNt), the election day or the first trading day after elections if elections take place on weekend 
(Nt) and the five days after elections (ANt), respectively. BRIt, RIt and ARIt are dummy variables 
to test for any effect of the day prior to regional investiture session, the regional investiture 
session day and the day after the regional investiture session, respectively. BEt, Et and AEt are 
dummy variables capturing the effect, if any, on the day prior to European elections, the 
European elections day and the day after, respectively. BGRt, GRt and AGRt are dummy 
variables to test for any effect on the day prior to general referendum taking place, the general 
referendum day and the day after, respectively. RSt is the return on Spanish index at time t, RWt 
is the return on the World index at time t, Mt is a dummy variable capturing the Monday effect on 
Spanish returns before 25 November 1991. Panel B reports the Adjusted R
2, the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC), the Schwarz Criteria (SC), and the Durbin-Watson statistic (D-W). 
Panel C shows the Benchmark Model and the corresponding deviance Statistic (critical values 
in parenthesis). * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Panel A  Model 11  Model 12  Model 13 
Variable  Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat.  Coefficient  t-stat. 
Α  -2.93E-05 -0.263 -3.06E-05 -0.274  -2.  62E-05  -0.235 
RWt  0.8667* 80.505 0.8666*  80.514 0.8670*  80.686 
RSt-1  0.0512* 5.671 0.0512* 5.665  0.0513*  5.681 
Mt 0.0030*  6.770  0.0029* 6.692  0.0029*  6.762 
BNt  -0.0040* -5.641 -0.0040* -5.623  -0.0040*  -5.659 
Nt  -0.0212* -20.060 -0.0212*  -20.084 -0.0211*  -19.934 
ANt  0.0079* 8.389 0.0078* 8.377  0.0078*  8.348 
BRIt  0.0004 0.1112         
RIt  -0.0017 -0.8084         
ARIt  0.0006 0.2719         
BEt     -0.0014  -0.215    
Et     -0.0016  -0.133    
AEt     0.0070  0.556    
BGRt        -0.0022  -0.1865 
GRt        -0.0060  -1.1659 
AGRt        0.0036  0.4277 
0 γ   1.31E-06* 8.178 1.31E-06* 8.196  1.30E-06*  8.177 
1 − t h   0.0744* 20.650 0.0744*  20.660 0.0747*  20.680 
2
2 − t ε   0.9216* 300.36 0.9215*  301.03 0.9213*  300.55 
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Table 6. Estimates of Models 11, 12 and 13 (continued) 
 
Panel B  Model 11  Model 12  Model 13 
Adjusted R
2  24.77% 24.78%  24.73% 
AIC -6.22  -6.22  -6.22 
SC -6.21  -6.21  -6.21 
D-W 1.96  1.96  1.96 
 
 
Panel C  Model 11  Model 12  Model 13 
Benchmark 
Model 
Model 8  Model 8  Model 8 
Deviance 
Statistic 
0.64* (13.4)  2.26 (13.4) 2.42  (13.4) 
 
 
elections, and 0 otherwise; Et is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is European 
elections day or the first trading day after the election day if European elections day 
takes place during the weekend or on a bank holiday, and 0 otherwise; and AEt is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is the day after European elections, and 0 
otherwise.  
 
From Table 6, it is shown that the coefficients on these three dummy variables 
are not significant, so that it can be stated that there is no impact of European elections 
on the Spanish stock exchange. 
 
Lastly, we have wanted to consider general referendums as political events that 
may influence the Spanish stock exchange. To do so, we proceed similarly to before. 
Three dummy variables are included to capture the effects of general referendum on the 
Spanish excess returns in the previous day, the referendum day and the day after. 
National referendums included in our analysis are those of December 1978 for the 
ratification of the Spanish Constitution, March 1986 for the permanence of Spain in the 
NATO and February 2005 for the Spanish ratification of the European Constitution. 
Model (8) is adapted as follows: 
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where BGRt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is the day prior to general 
referendum, and 0 otherwise; GRt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if t is general 
referendum day or the day after the election day if general referendum day takes place 
during the weekend or on a bank holiday, and 0 otherwise; and AGRt is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if t is the day after general referendum, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Coming back to Table 6, results show that Spanish excess returns have been no 
affected by general referendum taking place, indicating that there is likely no substantial 
information embedded into these political events’ outcome. 
 
As an overall conclusion of this section, Spanish stock exchange only reacts to 
general elections and, in this case, the exhibited behaviour is consistent with the UIH, 
since excess returns become positive as uncertainty is reduced. Other political events 
such as investiture sessions, regional elections, European elections or general 
referendum are shown not to have any impact on the Spanish bourse.  
  
4.2. Response of volatility to political events 
 
Uncertainty regarding the policies that will be carried out by the future 
government is likely to increase stock market volatility. In fact, prices are expected to 
(sometimes abruptly) adjust to the new information arriving to the market. It is therefore 
interesting to further examine the link between politics and stock market behaviour by 
focusing on election-induced volatility. In order to address this question, we follow two 
different approaches. 
 
The first approach consists of comparing the volatility before and after each 
elections day, over several time horizons, i.e. 5 days, 10 days, 15 days and 20 days. We 
take the residuals from the estimation of Model (3) and test the null hypothesis that the 
volatility is equal to zero. The Brown-Forsythe (modified Levene) test is employed to 
determine if there are significant differences in volatility over the reported intervals.  
 
Table 7 shows the probability of rejecting the null of equal variances before and 
after national elections. We note that there are no meaningful differences in the 
volatility of returns over the considered time horizons, except for the case of 1996 
national election, in which volatility computed, once the election outcome is known,   26
appears to be higher than before election day, for the ten-day and the fifteen-day 
intervals.   
 
Table 7. Test of equality of variances  
 
This table presents the test of equality of variances before and after national elections over 
several daily intervals shown in the first column. The reported probability value is the p-value, or 
marginal significance level, against a two-sided alternative. If this probability value is less than 
the size of the test, say 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis. 
 
  1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004  2008 
5  0.4532 0.1556 0.9173  0.7739  0.3766  0.4605  0.1037  0.3068  0.5577  0.6804 
10  0.2466 0.2269 0.6252  0.7972  0.2353  0.4573 0.0470 0.3237  0.5967  0.9089 
15  0.2110 0.2861 0.9743  0.7729  0.5990  0.9233 0.0430 0.1378  0.8061  0.4358 
20  0.2788  0.3605  0.7753  0.4134  0.5403  0.9956  0.1743  0.3114  0.6663  0.2525 
 
 
However, a word of caution is needed. Indeed, according to Kalev et al. (2004), 
the use of unconditional volatility often generates peak or inconclusive results regarding 
the news-volatility relation whenever heteroskedasticity is present. Hence, as a 
robustness check of the results, we also analyze the impact of elections on volatility by 
employing the conditional volatility in order to take the volatility persistence effect into 
account.  
 
Thus, within the second approach, the dummy variables capturing the effect of 
national elections on the Spanish index returns are also set as exogenous variables in the 
conditional variance equation of the GARCH (1,1) specification, Model (8),  as follows: 
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As shown in Table 8, Model (14) performs better than Model (8), according to 
deviance statistic. Several results are derived from the estimation of the above model. 
Firstly, the coefficient on the dummy variable capturing the effect of national elections 
on the index return during the previous days to the election date on the mean equation, 
π1, has become statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on the dummy variable 
related to the days after elections is significant only at the 10% level with the inclusion 
of the dummy variables in the variance equation. The significance of the rest of the   27
coefficients of the mean equation remains unchanged. Secondly, regarding the potential 
effect of national elections on the volatility of returns, the coefficients on the dummy 
variable for the election day,  2 λ , and on the dummy variable for the five days after the 
election day,  3 λ , are significant and respectively positive and negative, indicating that 
volatility increases on the election day whereas decreases during the following days, as 
uncertainty gradually vanishes. Indeed, it appears that investors are waiting for the 
definitive distribution of votes and until such uncertainty does not disappear high levels 
of volatility are observed. It should be noticed, however, that the magnitude of each 
coefficient is quite low, suggesting that the impact of national elections on the volatility 
of returns is somewhat limited. The log likelihood measure increases significantly, 
implying that the inclusion of these dummy variables into the variance equation 
improves the overall goodness-of-fit of the model. Furthermore, the GARCH effect 
does not disappear entirely (as shown by the statistically significant  1 γ  and  2 γ ), 
indicating that the days surrounding national elections do not logically cover all the 
sources of information. These results are in accordance to those obtained by Bialkowski 
et al. (2008), who reported an abnormal rise in volatility in the elections day that 
continued for a number of days thereafter and only started to decrease around fifteen 
days after elections. These authors justified such a prolonged reaction arguing that the 
official results may not be immediately released.  
5. Summary and conclusions  
In this paper we look into the link between politics and the Spanish stock 
exchange. Specifically, we have studied the empirical implications of both the Political 
Business Cycle Theory and the Uncertain Information Hypothesis. Our results indicate 
that there are no systematic differences in excess returns in the last two years preceding 
an election, that market responses are of the same magnitude when incumbents win or 
lose the election, and that there is no difference between the excess returns during left-
wing and non-left-wing governments. In overall, all these results indicate that there is 
not evidence in favour of a government cycle in Spain. 
 
  Regarding to the stock market performance around election dates, volatility is 
shown to increase in the elections day (or the day after if elections take place during the 
weekend) and subsequently it decreases which could be explained in terms of different 
levels of uncertainty. The greater is the uncertainty, the greater is the volatility.  
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Table 8. Estimates of Model 14 
 
Panel A presents the estimates of Model (14). BN, Nt, and ANt, are dummy variables to test for 
any effect of the national elections on returns during the ten previous days (BNt), the election 
day or the first trading day after elections if elections take place on weekend (Nt) and the five 
days after elections (ANt), respectively. These three dummies have been included also into the 
conditional variance equation of the GARCH(1,1) specification to test the effects of national 
elections on volatility. RSt is the return on Spanish index at time t, RWt is the return on the 
World index at time t, Mt is a dummy variable capturing the Monday effect on Spanish returns 
before 25 November 1991. Panel B reports the Adjusted R
2, the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC), the Schwarz Criteria (SC), and the Durbin-Watson statistic (D-W). Panel C shows the 
Benchmark Model and the corresponding deviance Statistic (critical values in parenthesis). * (**) 
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A  Model 14 
Variable  Coefficient t-stat. 
Α  -2.18E-05 -0.197 
RWt  0.8633** 80.837 
RSt-1  0.0528** 5.888 
Mt  0.0029** 6.802 
BNt  -0.0012 -1.114 
Nt  -0.0574** -8.269 
ANt  0.0054* 1.633 
0 γ   1.51E-06** 8.758 
1 − t h   0.0710** 20.522 
2
2 − t ε   0.9205** 306.314 
BNt  -4.48E-07 -0.127 
Nt  0.0013** 4.145 
ANt  -0.0002** -3.898 
 
Panel B  Model 14 
Adjusted R





Panel C  Model 14 
Benchmark Model  Model 8 
Deviance Statistic  93.56* (13.4) 
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Furthermore, negative price changes are observed in the days prior to elections, 
reverting to positive once the election takes place. Our results are in line with the work 
of Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988, 1993) on the  Uncertain Information Hypothesis 
that postulates that volatility of stock returns increases following the arrival of 
unexpected information and prices should rise as uncertainty is resolved. The negative 
return on the first day following the election date could be interpreted as the market 
needs time to assess the elections’ impact following the vote count and/or the 
forthcoming policies. 
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